In this paper the conceptual frameworks, which make different predictions about the effect of board leadership structure on firm risk-taking behaviour, are examined. From a sample of 243 Australian listed firms, it is found that leadership structure does not have any significant influence on firm risk; higher blockholder ownership or lower dividend payout is related to increased performance variance. This research suffers from some limitations; the archival study of the functional background of board chairman may not reveal the underlying relationship between the board of directors and firm risktaking behaviour. We only test the influence of leadership structure on performance variance; further research could investigate the potential impact of board composition on firm risk-taking propensity.
Introduction
The global movement for corporate governance reforms has gained momentum in the past fifteen years. Panasian et al (2003) observed that much of this trend was influenced by the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992) in the U.K. The Report, sometimes referred to as the Magna Carta of Corporate Governance (Gregory, 2001) , comments that the board of directors must retain full and effective monitor over the executive management; given the importance and particular nature of the chairman's role, it should be in principle separate from that of the chief executive officer (CEO).
As noted by Faleye (2007) , following the momentum created by the Cadbury Report (1992) it becomes a consensus among shareholder activists, institutional investors and regulators that the CEO should not also serve as chairman. Dahya (2004) found that between 1994 and 2003 regulators and stock exchange in 16 countries issued reports recommending the separation of CEO and chairman duties.
Australia had watched closely as big corporate failures such as Enron and WorldCom had prompted the U.S. regulatory authorities to launch significant reforms. In 2003 the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) released Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (Guidelines, 2003) which reflects "best international practice", including the recommendation that the roles of chairman and CEO should not be exercised by the same individual, and the chairman should be an independent director 21 . Prior research on board leadership has generally focused on the performance dimension, and has provided divergent perceptions regarding the performance outcome of CEO duality. The purpose of this study is to extend this literature to other leadership structures than CEO duality, and firm risktaking behavior. We attempt to address the following question -does board leadership structure have any effect on firm risk-taking behavior, for a more comprehensive understanding of the consequences of board leadership.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a brief introduction to the recent studies in this area is provided; the potential links between board leadership structure and firm risk as suggested by different theories are discussed in Section 3, resulting in three hypotheses. Section 4 describes the research design used to test these hypotheses. The findings of data analysis are reported in Section 5, leading to conclusions in Section 6.
Literature Review
As discussed in Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994) , the most important, controversial and inconclusive question in corporate governance research is whether CEO duality, that is, the practice of one person serving both as a firm's CEO and as board chairman, contributes to or inhibits firm performance. The two views, drawn from agency theory and stewardship theory respectively, would appear to be at odds with each other. Adopting an agency theory perspective it would be argued to split the roles of CEO and board chairman would facilitate more effective monitoring of the CEO, and firms failing to do so may underperform those in which the two positions are split (Rechner and Dalton, 1991) . While stewardship theorists argue that the duality of roles establishes a strong and unambiguous leadership, and firms with CEO duality may make better and faster decisions and therefore may out-perform those which split the positions (Donaldson and Davis, 1991) .
The empirical evidence, primarily from the US initially and more broadly in recent years, has been mixed. Elsayed (2007) argued that prior studies were subject to a number of research limitations including failure to control for significant variables that would be likely to confound the relationship between CEO duality and performance. The performance measures and resulting finding of prior studies are summarised in Table 1. Kim and Buchanan (2008) discovered that the literature had paid little attention to investigating the implications of CEO duality on strategic management practices such as firm risk-taking behaviour. As a consequence little is known about the contribution to agent opportunism or the promotion of stewardship behaviour in a firm's strategic management practices when there is duality at the top.
Thus, using a sample of 290 large U.S. corporations the authors examined the empirical relationship between CEO duality and firm risktaking propensity. They reported that consistent with the agency theory perspective, CEO duality reduced firm risk as measured by the standard deviation of ROA.
However, traditionally emphasized mechanisms of board independence and managerial shareholdings were found to be ineffective in controlling managerial risk-averse preference. Rather it was found that institutional ownership moderated the negative correlation between the duality structure and firm risk. In this study the work of Kim and Buchanan (2008) is extended beyond CEO duality to other board leadership structures. Specifically the applicability of two theories, agency theory and organizational portfolio theory, which make different predictions about the effect of board leadership on firm risk-taking propensity, are tested; the findings may shed light on the impact of the recent changes to the regulatory environment as introduced by the ASX Guidelines (2003). To our best knowledge it presents the first empirical evidence on the risk preferences of leadership structures in the Australian context.
Hypotheses
Denis and McConnell (2003) commented that an extensive literature has built up on corporate governance in general, and boards of directors in particular, following the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) , in which the authors applied agency theory to corporations and modeled the agency costs of outside equity. A central assumption of the theory is that managers will pursue their own goals (self interest) rather than seek to maximise shareholder wealth, unless they are kept in check by a vigilant, independent board (Castaldi and Wortmann 1984, Daily et al 2002) .
Agency theorists have argued that shareholders (the Principal) generally favor actions that maximize returns, even when accompanied by higher risk, because they are able to diversify against risk by selecting specific stocks for their portfolios. Managers (the Agent), on the other hand, cannot readily diversify their employment risks across a range of investments, as a result they tend to be more risk averse than may be in the interests of shareholders, and would prefer low risk strategies (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama 1980 In other words, if there is a good business opportunity involving high risk, shareholders would expect managers to seize the opportunity as a means to maximize their investment return, while managers would be more likely to be hesitant to take this option as their rewards from risk-taking, particularly if not successful, could be devastating to them (Kim and Buchanan, 2008) . Managers are more concerned about their employment risk and firm survival than wealth maximization for shareholders (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990 ). To test the potential link between board leadership and firm risk the following hypothesis is posed:
The executive board chairperson will increase firm risk aversion (agency theory). The Guidelines (2003) identifies several personal and professional affiliations that may limit the independence of non-executive directors. These affiliated directors, or "grey" directors as coined by Baysinger and Bulter (1985) , appear to sit somewhere between being executive and independent directors. For most their primary employment is not dependent directly on the firm in which they serve as directors but they do have a personal stake in the firm with financial and/or kinship relationships with the firm or its managers (Ellstrand et al, 2002) . These affiliations arguably would affect the monitoring role as expected of the board and these directors within agency theory. It could be expected that these affiliated directors could be inclined to support low risk strategies as favoured by management (Johnson et al 1996 , Ellstrand et al 2002 . To this expectation the following hypothesis is posed:
The affiliated board chairperson will increase firm risk aversion (agency theory). Heslin and Donaldson (1999) and Donaldson (2000) proposed a new theory of organizational change and success -organizational portfolio theory, which is built on the premise that low performance is required to trigger adaptive organizational changes. It is acknowledged that the theory is at present "… a series of propositions waiting for empirical testing. Only after it has received such empirical confirmation would the policy implications sketched here become valid prescriptions" (Donaldson, 2000, p.395) .
Contrary to the assumption of agency theory, Heslin and Donaldson (1999) argued that, in general, executive directors would increase risk (lower levels of risk aversion) and independent directors would reduce risk (higher levels of risk aversion). During periods when executives represent a large proportion of the board, the firm is willingness to take greater risk; when peaks from these high risk strategies occur with favourable combinations of other portfolio factors outstanding performance is likely to result. This reinforces confidence in the integrity and competence of a largely non-independent corporate governance structure and bolsters the position of executives on the board. However, when troughs in these high risk strategies occur simultaneously with other performance-depressing portfolio factors 22 , the particularly low performance may trigger the installation of an independent chairman and a higher proportion of independent directors on the board. The resulting risk-averse governance tends to reduce firm performance variance. It is considered that reducing firm risk may be a means of increasing short-term economic value (Brealey and Myers, 1996) . Heslin and Donaldson (1999) asserted that risk aversion could prevent the performance crises needed to trigger required structural adaptation; high economic value achieved by lowering risk is thereby prone to inhibiting long-term growth and profitability. It is hypothesised:
The independent board chairperson will increase firm risk aversion (organizational portfolio theory). In conformity with prior studies financial institutions including property trusts and investment funds were removed from the dataset due to a lack of comparable data in the financial institutions section In gathering the information required to complete the testing in this study, in addition to Huntley's Shareholder (2003) providing information on firm age and lines of business, the Connect 4 database containing the annual reports of the top 500 companies, and the Fin Analysis database containing market information and statistics of Australian firms were used. Due to the non-availability of items of required data from these sources the sample was further reduced to 243 firms. If the chairman is an outside director and the sources of information only divide board members into executives and non-executives, the chairman will be classified as an affiliated or independent director, using the definition of independence adopted by the ASX Corporate Governance Council as the benchmark 25 . The details of directors are available in the director's report, corporate governance statement and related party note to the financial statements. If a close analysis of this information was not able to provide an objective basis for determining director independence, the company was excluded from the analysis.
Empirical Testing
The measurement of firm risk has been discussed by a number of researchers (Baird and Thomas 1990, Beatty and Zajac 1994). Baird and Thomas (1990) discussed the way risk has been conceptualized by different disciplines. They considered management, finance, marketing and psychology, and concluded that researchers in the field of strategic management typically defined risk as the unpredictability of business outcome variables, for example, the variability of accounting or shareholder return. Kim and Buchanan (2008) employed income stream variance as the measure, i.e., the standard deviation of ROA. They argued that this would reflect managerial risk-taking behaviour.
In Donaldson 2000) . In this study the measure of risk adopted will be the standard deviation of shareholder return. In order to reduce the influence of short-term fluctuations three-year averages of data were used; the averages were across the 2003-2006 financial years.
To locate the specific effect of leadership structure on firm risk aversion this study considered empirical models identified in prior research that had 25 There is a list of the persons who should not be considered independent in Box 2.1 of the Guidelines (2003); however, it is unclear how long an independent director could serve on the same board. This research follows the U.K. Higgs Report (2003) which nominates ten years in relation to the director tenure consideration. Table 2 .
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are developed for the research variables as described in Table 2 , in which firm risk serves as the dependent variable; the independent variables consist of leadership structure, firm age, blockholder and managerial shareholdings, dividend payout, leverage, firm size, diversification, prior performance and board size. Moreover, sensitivity tests on the regressions without firm size control are performed to assess the robustness of findings. An algebraic statement of the models is presented below: 
Results
An overview of descriptive characteristics is provided in Table 3 showing firm characteristics for the sample in 2003 26 . Among the 243 chairpersons of the boards of directors 47 (19.34%) were executive directors, 114 (46.91%) were independent directors and 82 (33.74%) were affiliated directors. The Table reveals that the sample contains a wide range of firms. The number of years the company had been listed on the stock exchange ranges from a low of 3 to a high of 132, with an average of almost 17 years. Block ownership varies from a minimum of 13.60% to almost 100% while managerial ownership varies from none to 81% with a mean of 65.10% and 11.84% respectively. The number of business segments ranges from 1 to 11, and number of directors on the board ranges from 3 to 15, with an average of just over 4 and 6, respectively.
The contribution of board leadership and other variables to performance variance is reported in Table  4 . According to the Table there is no statistically significant relationship between the presence of executive, independent or affiliated chairperson, and the risk measure. Table 5 displays the results for sensitivity tests without firm size control, in which no significant influence of leadership structure on firm risk-taking behaviour could be identified. With respect to the control variables used in the analysis, some consistent patterns emerge from Table 4 The results show that poor dividend payout may be related to increased performance variance. However, contrary to the findings in Kim and Buchanan (2008) , it appears that higher managerial shareholdings would reduce firm risk-taking propensity (see Table 4 ), although the effect of managerial ownership becomes insignificant in the additional tests without firm size control (see Table  5 ); we leave this issue for future investigation.
Conclusions
This study focuses on an area often overlooked in the literature, namely, the relationship between the board of directors and firm risk-taking behaviour. The results do not support the three hypotheses which have been developed from agency theory and organizational portfolio model. It could be concluded that, in the Australian market, board leadership structure does not have any significant influence on firm risk.
The data analysis suggests that higher blockholder ownership increases performance variance; the evidence supports the proposition that blockholders could affect management practices. Moreover, it is found that poor dividend payout leads to increased risk. There are some limitations for this study. First, the archival investigation of the functional background of chairman may not reveal the underlying relationship between the board of directors and performance risk. Second, the sample tested is restricted to companies listed on the ASX; therefore the conclusions should not be extrapolated to all Australian firms. Finally, we only test the influence of leadership structure on performance variance; further research is required to investigate the potential impact of board composition as measure by, for example, the proportion of affiliated, executive or independent directors on the board, on firm risk.
